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This paper is divided into three parts. The first part provides an overview of 
literature on how the role and assessment of bureaucracy in the Third World in 
general and Pakistan in particular has undergone change. The second part examines 
the changing socioeconomic profile and corresponding attitudinal changes if any, in 
Pakistan’s bureaucracy. The third part provides guidelines for possible reform in 
Pakistan’s federal bureaucracy. 
 
ASSESSING BUREAUCRACY: A REVIEW 
OF LITERATURE 
For almost two decades (i.e. 1950–1970) the academic community presented 
bureaucracy in the developing countries as engine of growth, development and an 
agent of change [Lapalambora (1963) and Apter (1967)]. Bureaucracy in Pakistan 
provided a lead and received laudatory comments for its role in initiating economic 
development and promoting political stability [Huntington (1968); Von Vorys (1965) 
and Braibanti (1966)]. Bureaucratic elites and public institutions were expected to 
provide leadership, order and stability. Again Pakistani bureaucracy stood the test 
and fulfilled these expectations [Huntington (1968)]. By the late 1960s that 
witnessed movements of popular protest and agitation against the authoritarian and 
repressive role of the government, the opposition political parties, and a segment of 
the print media started portraying the bureaucracy as an instrument of oppression. 
This portrayal had an impact on public consciousness.  Bureaucrats were seen as 
being inimical to their interests. By the mid-1970s the academic community and the 
World Bank (both in their own wisdom and direction) began to reassess and re-
evaluate the role of bureaucracy [Donell (1973) and Laporte (1975)]. In the early 
1980s the World Bank studies began casting aspersions on bureaucracy’s ability to 
promote order and development in the Third World. Corruption, inefficiency, bloated 
size, absence of accountability, and resistance to change were portrayed as the 
manifestations of bureaucracy [World Bank Report (1983–1993)]. The academic 
community raised concerns about authoritarian values and corrupt practices that 
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bureaucracies promoted in the developing countries—i.e. violation of human rights 
and suppression of liberties. The academic community recognised and conceded 
some positive contribution of bureaucracy in the direction of growth and 
development [Burki and Laporte (1986)]. In short negative images of bureaucracy 
and a cry for reform dominated the policy and academic research environment. 
In 1991, three papers presented by Boeninger, Mills and Serageldin at the 
World Bank Conference on Development Economics brought the issue of 
governance to the core of the debate on institutional reform [Boeninger, Landell-
Mills and Serageldin (1991)]. The World Bank economists conceded and recognised 
that governance was no longer a matter of economic development alone. There were 
cultural, political and institutional factors that influenced the process of governance. 
These studies drew attention towards the fact that good governance was a function of 
political will and commitment of the leadership, which in turn was affected by 
cultural, historical/institutional settings of a country. That external environment i.e. 
conditions of aid, pressures of donor agencies and international institutions also 
influenced styles and modes of governance. In short, public policy debate underwent 
a paradigm shift in which institutional reform i.e. reform of the bureaucracy, 
judiciary, legislatures became the cry of this decade. Thus, the World Bank, IMF and 
UNDP, provided the lead in initiating a dialogue on reform strategy for the 
bureaucracies in the Third World. Given this context, how should one assess the role 
of bureaucracy? What kind of leadership can it provide in managing public 
institutions? What type of strategies can be adopted to build an efficient bureaucracy 
that may promote good governance? 
Bureaucracy is pivotal to modern government. This is recognised both by the 
proponents and the opponents of bureaucracy. In a developing country what is the 
primary function of bureaucracy? The answer could vary depending on the culture of 
a society, its level of socioeconomic development and the nature of its political 
system. In a traditional sense, in most political systems, bureaucracy has been 
expected to ensure continuity of policies, political order/stability, uphold rule of law, 
promote economic development and cultural cohesion. These traditional functions 
have been forcefully defended by the proponents of bureaucracy. 
If one were to look at the performance of bureaucracy in the Third World the 
results are mixed. In most countries of South Asia, the authority and social elite 
status of bureaucracy is still recognised; despite erosion of power and politicisation. 
Its major failure is in its inability to promote welfare, development, equity and 
provide justice to the citizens. 
Peter Drucker in a recent article “In defense of Japans Bureaucracy” makes a 
strong case for elitism and continuity as hallmarks of a strong bureaucracy [Drucker 
(1998)]. Elites of merit and function if respected in a society, as the Japanese case 
demonstrates, do promote continuity and cohesion. Drucker argues that the Japanese 
bureaucracy has performed these two tasks ably, despite other serious problems. 
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Furthermore, Drucker asserts that in most developed countries, “Bureaucracy 
dominates policy-making process. America and few European countries are an 
exception” [Drucker (1998)]. This leads him to conclude that the: 
bureaucratic elites have far greater staying power then we are willing 
to concede. They manage to keep power for decades despite scandals 
and proven incompetence. 
He hastens to add, that without ruling elites most developed countries fear 
social disintegration. It is this “staying power” that sustains continuity and enhances 
the enduring capacity of bureaucracy. In the case of Japan, Drucker argues it has 
worked well because it keeps the society integrated. The Japanese feel that their 
society is fragile. Therefore bureaucracy as a ruling elite is considered essential to 
ensure cohesion. 
Drucker is so convinced of elitism and continuity as an enduring aspect of 
bureaucracy as to assert that in some societies and situations “procrastination” was 
wiser than action. To what degree the experience and functioning of Japan’s 
bureaucracy is relevant to Pakistan? It cannot be denied that very much like Japan, 
Pakistani society does give credence and legitimacy to its elites.  
Broadly speaking in our context, the elites can be divided into two categories 
i.e. elites of ascription—who enjoy position of power, privilege and prestige on the 
basis of their descent, family, social class etc. Second, the elites of merit, 
achievement and excellence. The latter enjoy a position of power, privilege and 
prestige on the basis of education and professionalism. In most societies the 
relationship between elites of ascription and those of achievement is complex and 
Pakistan is no exception. In most developing societies the size of elites of merit and 
achievement is small (although it is growing) and social class origins can be an 
advantage for some and disadvantagious for others. The gulf widens because equal 
opportunity of education is not available to all. Thus a symbiosis between ascription 
and achievement is pronounced. On occasions in Pakistani context, it becomes 
difficult to draw a distinction between the two types of elites. The newspaper reports 
and popular writings have considerably blurred this distinction. Consequently, the 
elites of merit and achievement have to struggle constantly to acquire legitimacy. It 
is worth noting that in our case bureaucracy, (despite limitations and failures) has 
been performing the task of ensuring continuity in policies. Secondly, despite 
frequent and sometimes sudden changes of governments Pakistani bureaucracy 
continues to manifest considerable “staying power” notwithstanding the charges of 
corruption and inefficiency.  
A certain degree of cohesion, staying power, organisational capacity to sustain 
continuity of policies, preserve the status quo and maintain a semblance of stability 
continue to be the hallmarks of Pakistani bureaucracy. Is it possible to bring out any 
attitudinal and structural changes in the Pakistani bureaucracy?  
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According to Osborne and Plastrick, the new gurus and out-spoken advocates 
of Banishing Bureaucracy and Reinventing Government [Obsorne and Plastrick 
(1996), Obsorne and Baebler (1993)], there is a need to redesign the “DNA” of 
bureaucracy. The two argue that bureaucracy must be changed and restructured from 
within. This would be accomplished by adopting the following strategy: 
 – To restructure public organisations to redefine their purposes. 
 – Enhance accountability. 
 – Provide incentives. 
 – Re-organise distribution of power, and most importantly. 
 – Change their cultures. 
What is important to recognise is that the traditional concept of governance 
(i.e. hierarchical, authoritarian, and emphasising chain of command) is under-going a 
change. Instead, Osborne and Plastrick argue that reinvention is possible only 
through “collaboration between elected official and the civil servant”. They also 
recognise that public institutions were “designed to be stable”, but hasten to add that:  
we have reached a point in history where stability is counter productive. 
In today’s fast changing, globally competitive information age, systems 
that cannot change are doomed to failure. They are like the dinosaurs, 
which could not evolve fast enough to survive when their environment 
changed. 
This observation is pertinent because it clearly suggests that bureaucratic stability 
without adaptability and capacity to innovate is meaningless and self-destructive. 
It appears to me that Osborne and Plastrick are not advocating elimination of 
bureaucracies, they are only “Whistle blowing”—i.e., if the bureaucracies do not 
mend their ways they would face extinction like “dinosaurs”. The warning is timely, 
as it has not only intensified debate on the degree and shape of bureaucracy in a 
modern state but also provided tools and ideas through which public institutions may 
be reinvigorated and strengthened. 
There is a growing consensus among policy-makers, intellectuals and 
international institutions that effective public institutions are essential for smooth 
functioning of the state [World Bank Report (1997); Osborne and Plastrick (1996); 
Turner and David Hulme (1997)]. This realisation is also growing that whereas 
expansion and strengthening of civil society is a desirable goal non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are no substitute for the government. Therefore public 
institutions and bureaucracy are crucial components for good governance. The 
challenge for the state is to reform and rebuild the public institutions that would be 
competitive, enterprising and capable of upholding the rule of law. Thus reform in 
civil service demands prudence and caution. Laws and procedures should be adopted 
through transparent mechanisms, so that they promote merit, fairplay and 
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accountability among public officials. Clearly, strengthening bureaucracy does not 
mean preserving the status quo, it implies building the capacity to initiate change and 
manage it effectively. The World Bank Report 1997, correctly states that:  
Once poor systems are in place, they can be very difficult to dislodge. 
Strong interests develop to maintain the status quo, however inefficient 
or unfair. And those who lose out from present arrangements may be 
able to bring effective pressure to bear for change. 
In such circumstances public institutions become not only resisters of change 
and innovation but also develop into instruments of repression, partisanship and are 
portrayed as corrupt, unjust and inefficient. It is these images and perceptions that 
evoke criticism from the opponents of bureaucracy—who demand reform and 
innovation in the workings of public institutions. 
The foregoing review of literature captures the debate on the centrality of 
bureaucracy, its staying power, elite status, capacity to sustain, continuity of policies 
and its reluctance to change giving rise to demands for reform and innovation in its 
functioning. The challenge is:  how to build a bureaucracy that is efficient, humane, 
development-driven, is citizen-friendly and facilitates good governance and human 
development. 
In view of the changing socioeconomic profile of Pakistani bureaucracy, the 
demands for reform and the changes it has undergone as a result of this reform effort 
we may ask whether the reorientation of bureaucracy is a desirable goal? 
 
DO CHANGES IN SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE 
PROMOTE ATTITUDINAL CHANGE? 
Pakistan had a small bureaucracy at the time of independence. However in the 
past five decades it has grown and expanded and become a fairly large and 
amorphous lot. Federal government employs over 5 lakh civil servants. Out this 90 
percent are between Grade 1–15, while 10 percent are in Grades 16–22. Of these the 
CSS officers comprise around 5 percent. The focus of attention and analysis in this 
section are these powerful privileged and prestigious elites. 
In the past five decades the structure of the civil services has undergone 
enormous transformation. If one were to take the socioeconomic status (SES) and 
education as two variables, those who joined the civil services during the decade of 
1950 to 1960s, almost 70 percent came from the middle class, about  25 percent 
belonged to the upper class, while those from the lower middle class were around 5 
percent. About 60 to 65 percent had done M.A./M.Sc and 40 to 45 percent were simple 
B.A/B.Sc. The average age of a new entrant to the service was 22-23 years [Ahmad 
(1964) and Braibanti (1966)]. Has this profile undergone any change? Statistics for the 
decade 1987–97 reveal that almost 88 percent describe themselves belonging to the 
middle class, while 4 percent belong to the upper class, and 8 percent to the lower 
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class. About 75 percent have M.A/M.Sc degrees (including 20 to 30 percent doctors 
and engineers) the percentage of simple graduates has declined to about 25 percent. 
The average age of a new entrant to the service is 27-28 years (See Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Years SES (%) Education (%) Av. Age (Yr) 
1950–1960 5  LC 
70 MC 
25 UC 
    60  MA/MSc 
    40  BA/BSc 
22-23 
1987–1997 8  LC 
88 MC 
4  UC 
    75  MA/MSc* 
    25  BA/BSc 
27-28 
SES = Socioeconomic Skills (Lower class, Middle class, Upper class). 
       * (includes doctors, engineers). 
 
Furthermore, a substantial number joining the Civil Services hail from the 
urban middle classes. The Common Training Programme (CTP) data indicates that 
from the 1st CTP to 22nd CTP (1973–1995) a total of 3,374 officers joined the 
twelve federal services of Pakistan. Among these, the most prominent are the 
children of the government servants (900) (i.e. sons/daughters of a clerk to a high 
ranking officer) the second largest group is that of the offsprings of professionals 
(515) (Doctors, Engineers, Lawyers), followed by Agriculturalist/landlords (514) and  
businessmen (406). The number of children of the Civil Servants (i.e. CSS Officers) 
is (167) and that of Defence Forces Officers (165). 
Beside these other social and occupational groups in the society are also 
adequately  represented  in  the  higher  civil  services  (See  Table 2).  These groups,  
 
Table 2 
Composition of CSS Officers Background 
[Data Based on Forms from (1973 to 1995)] 
Ranking          Background Numbers (3374) % of Total 
1. Children of Govt. Servants  900 27.6% 
2. Children of Professionals 515 15.2% 
3. Children of Agriculturist/ Landlords 514 15.2% 
4. Children of Businessmen 406 12.% 
5. Children of Civil Servants (CSS) 167 5% 
6. Children of Defence Forces 165 5% 
7. Children of Farmers/Zamindars 277 6.7% 
8. Children of Shopkeeper/Trader Merchant 77 2.2% 
9. Industrialist/Private Sector 51 1.5% 
10. Others 352 10.6% 
  3374 100% 
Source: Compiled by Saeed Shafqat. 
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collectively constitute about 10 percent of the total CSS services. It is a myth that 
civil servants and their progenies have a monopoly in the services as some 
newspaper reports tend to convey. The data clearly demonstrates that since the 
children of the government servants, professionals, business groups, agriculturists/ 
landlords, civil servants and defence officers have better access to education they 
take and qualify the examination in larger numbers, therefore their dominance is 
visible. It is again understandable that as compared to other social groups, since these 
groups are more knowledgeable about patterns of authority and status associated 
with various groups (i.e. DMG, Police, Customs, Income Tax), therefore in 
identifying their service/group preference they are better informed at the time of 
going through the CSS examination process. 
Occasionally it does happen that despite attaining higher merit in the 
examination, a candidate ends up in a service that does not correspond with his/her 
merit position. This happens because of lack of information about the rankings of 
various service/groups in the structure of the government. In this sense the 
sons/daughters of civil servants have a definite advantage; they chose and join 
services and groups that enjoy power, authority and elite status. Therefore upon 
joining the service, despite being smaller in number they are more visible. This 
happens because of two reasons. First, their parents may have held prominent 
appointment as civil servants. Second, in our society where status is determined by 
lineage, achievement is down played.  This is newsworthy and promotes a public 
image that parental connections compromised merit. 
It is equally important to note that each year 1 to 5 cases of children of the 
under privileged class (a daily wage labourer, taxi driver, a peasant, petty clerk, 
shop keeper) have on the basis of competition, hard work and ability to excel 
entered the service lending legitimacy and credibility to the Federal Public Service 
Commission (FPSC) examination process, although in recent years the 
interviewing process and composition of the FPSC has come under criticism from 
various groups. 
The change is visible and pronounced. The new breed of entrants to the Civil 
Services is older, predominantly middle class and have a much more diversified 
educational background. Education and social class are two indicators that give 
credence to dynamic and modernist potential of the Civil Services of Pakistan. 
Given this social class and educational background, in their attitude, these 
new entrants to the civil services are politicised, pragmatic, adaptable, conscious of 
power and authority that is vested in them. They also recognise the social utility of 
greed that is prevalent in the society. Upon joining the civil services a substantial 
number still cherish the ideals of honesty, integrity, public good and service to the 
nation. Yet they are conscious of the fact that upon selection to the civil services, 
they have become members of an “elite governmental club”. They argue, that it is 
the civil society which bestows status upon them, develops unreal expectations and 
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encourages them to behave like a person who commands authority in public 
perception. This public perception plays an important role in attitude formation and 
influencing the conduct and behaviour of civil servants. 
While choosing a particular service the new entrants have the following 
considerations.  
 – What are the prospects of promotion in a particular occupational group?  
 –  What type of legitimate perks and privileges are available?  
 –  What is the culture of the service like—i.e. degree of ‘esprit de corps’, 
prospects of horizontal mobility etc?  
 –  How much symbolic value an occupational group has? This consideration is 
influenced by public perception and premium. 
 –  Finally, besides authority, prospects of making easy money is another 
important consideration. Are these considerations any different from those 
which were prevalent during the 1950s and 1960s? Is it a change in societal 
values or individual civil servant who has become morally bankrupt? 
Decline theorists insist that educational standard and quality of individuals 
joining the civil services is inferior if not poor as compared to what it was in 1950s 
and 1960s. In the eyes of the critics the structure of the services remains ‘colonial’ 
and ‘transformation’ has been ‘cosmetic’. In their perception civil servants remain 
arrogant, corrupt, over-bearing, inefficient and self-perpetuating [Mufti (1998) and 
Siddique (1999)]. They allege the structure of civil services is tottering apart, they 
are on the decline, and they warn as we move towards the 21st century, the civil 
services are ill equipped to govern or serve the people or meet the challenges that 
confront the country. This criticism merits attention. 
Recognising the concerns of the critics, it is contended that the Civil Services 
of Pakistan have come a long way. They have revealed the capacity to adapt, 
according to changing needs and political environment of the country. The service 
structure has become broad, relatively open and competitive. According to Federal 
Public Service Commission (FPSC) each year about 8000 persons apply for the CSS 
examination (Estimates of (1991–1997), about 3,000 actually take the examination, 
600 to 800 pass the written examination and depending on the vacancies available 
with the federal government in the 12 Federal Services, 170 to 200 are finally 
selected. Secondly, more senior positions are available to different occupational 
groups, although dominance of the Civil Services of Pakistan (CSP) is visible at the 
policy-making level—both in the federal and provincial governments. 
An overview of 50 years of Pakistan’s history would reveal the need for 
reforms in the civil services has been felt all along. Both civil and military regimes 
have ventured to change the attitude of the civil servants, reform the structure of the 
services to appease popular expectations, and expand their political control over 
bureaucracy. Most of these regimes have pursued purges and reforms as policy 
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instruments to change the behaviour of civil servant and expand their own political 
control. Each reform effort was preceded by a purge in the Civil Services of 
Pakistan. President Ayub’s purge was followed by the Cornellius Pay Services and 
Reform Commission of 1962. General Yahya’s famous purge of 303 was followed 
by publicising the recommendations of the Cornellius Report, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s 
1973 Administrative Reforms were preceded by massive purge of about 1300 civil 
servants. General Zia-ul-Haq’s government was exceptional to the extent that it did 
not pursue any systematic purge as a policy choice, but constituted  the Anwar-ul-
Haq Commission to rehabilitate and promote some level of confidence, among the 
Civil Services, particularly the CSP. In addition, it did what none of the earlier 
purges and reforms had none—it embarked upon a policy to redefine the ideological 
orientation of the civil servant by formally and informally encouraging a uniform 
dress code, a culture of prayer-break during office hours, with minimal emphasis on 
professional work ethics. Furthermore, the Zia-ul-Haq government expanded and 
institutionalised the induction of armed forces personnel into civil services. Zia-ul-
Haq instituted a 20 percent quota in the Civil Services for the Armed Forces—10 
percent to be recruited from grade 17 (i.e. Captain level) and other 10 percent from 
Major and beyond and even those who may have retired from services in the Armed 
Forces. Those who were inducted at the Captain level were placed in seniority above 
those who entered the service through merit and competition. This had a 
demoralising effect on the new recruitees. The cumulative effect of these measures 
was that the modernist, forward looking, and liberal qualities of professional 
competence were considerably eroded. 
These purges and reforms shook the confidence of the civil servants, led to 
politicisation and to a certain degree encouraged an environment where financial 
corruption and misuse of authority proportionately increased. It is in this broader 
context of purge and reform that the suspension of 87 civil servants in the early 1997 
and subsequent formation of a Task Force for civil service reform may be examined. 
During the first decade of Pakistan’s history the primary issues that attracted 
government’s attention were rehabilitation of the migrants, building infrastructure for 
development and institutions for governance. During this phase the officers of Audit 
and Accounts, Railways and Indian Political Service (IPS) dominated the national 
economic and political decision-making processes while the political leaders found it 
difficult to develop any consensus on a framework for developing a political system. 
During this phase of our history, the CSP chose to play an indirect role in politics. In 
the process they consolidated their cadre, built their image and reputation as relatively 
honest, efficient and dedicated civil servants. Unlike the army, the CSP, ‘did not take 
any direct action to subvert the political activity’ as the real power holders in the 
administrative set up. They did not challenge the politicians, rather left it to the 
military, to confront and replace the facade of parliament in Pakistan. Yet the military 
elites perceived the CSP as the real power holders and aimed to restrict their role. 
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THE RISE AND FALL  OF THE CSP 1958–1971 
The military regime under General Ayub Khan provided a challenge and an 
opportunity to the CSP. The challenge was that initially the military held the CSP as 
partly responsible for creating political chaos in the country: Therefore they applied 
pressure on the CSP cadre to mend its ways. In the first instance the military 
appointed about 272 armed forces officers to important administrative positions in 
the civil service. In the early 1959, it charged that 13 CSP officers had indulged in 
“corruption, misconduct, and inefficiency”. After a summary trial the regime forcibly 
retired the officers. This shook the confidence of the CSP cadre. [Burki (1969)]. The 
military regime demonstrated that it meant business and would purge the CSP, if 
they did not mend their ways. Thirdly, in August 1959, the regime appointed a Pay 
and Service Commission, which was headed by A. R. Cornellius, the Chief Justice of 
Supreme Court of Pakistan, who was known for his anti-CSP views. By such 
measures the regime conveyed the impression that it aimed to reorganise and 
restructure the services which implied eroding the power and privileges of the CSP. 
The CSP were able to resist the challenge that the military regime posed. The CSP 
showed pragmatism, flexibility and a certain degree of esprit de corps to reach an 
understanding and compromise with the military regime. Finally, in the same year an 
Economic Pool was created to manage the senior positions in the Ministry of 
Finance, Commerce and Economic Affairs. 40 percent of the pool’s positions were 
to be filled by non-CSP officers. The CSP perceived it as yet another effort to 
undermine their position, as previously these positions were totally reserved for the 
CSP. 
According to the changing needs of the country, the Establishment Division, 
devised a policy that starting from 1959, all CSP officers will be provided training in 
fields pertaining to Economics, Public Administration, Community Development, 
Finance, Accounting etc. Resultantly, by 1968, about 79 CSP officers had obtained 
training in 17 American and British universities [Burki (1969)]. Braibanti records 
that the Ford Foundation and USAID played a major role in building training 
institutions and providing fellowships for the civil servants [Braibanti (1966)]. By 
changing the direction of training to  new fields, the Establishment Division was able 
to not only strengthen the status of the CSP cadre, but also equipped a generation of 
civil servants who could lay claim on professional expertise in financial 
management, community development and good governance. 
This new breed of civil servants, enthusiastically supported the two 
programmes of the military regime, the Basic Democracies and Rural Development 
Programme. Both these programmes, enormously increased the power, privilege, 
prestige of the CSP cadre officers, who served in the districts. It also increased their 
interaction with the local politicians. Consequently, although the district officer was 
able to promote some sort of community development and welfare, yet as a cadre the 
CSP ran into conflict with the politicians. In the rural setting of Pakistan, the 
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politicians perceived them as ‘political manipulators’ and ‘instruments’ of the 
military regime. 
Thus by conceding entry of the military officers to the CSP cadre, 
reformulation of training programmes, and by enthusiastically supporting the 
policies of the military regime, the CSP were able to protect their elite status. The 
cadre was skillful in resisting and subverting the onslaught of Cornellius 
Commission report and its recommendations. But in the aftermath of Ayub’s fall the 
CSP could not retain their power and glory. Their reputation was tarnished and their 
confidence was shaken.  
 
CAUSES OF 1973 REFORM 
Whereas the need for reform had been long felt, the immediate causes of the 
1973 reforms can be analysed by focusing on the following three factors: student 
disturbances of 1968-69, dismemberment of the country, rise of the PPP to power. 
 1.  The student protest of 1968-69 which developed into a mass movement, 
leading to the collapse of Ayub government in March 1969 also targetted 
the bureaucracy, in particular the CSP. [Ahmad (1974)]. It was the structure 
and attitude of the CSP that was bitterly attacked and criticised from within 
the services as well as from the public in general. The CSP-bashing became 
a persistent theme in the print media and public speeches in 1969. On the 
2nd of December 1969 it culminated in the form of Martial Law Ordinance 
No. 58 by President Yahya Khan. As a consequence of this Order, 303 
Class-I Officers were removed from the service. Most of them were senior 
civil servants; 38 were from the CSP and 78 were from the Central Superior 
Services. This considerably undermined the power and prestige of the CSP. 
  It is interesting to note that this measure of Yahya Khan was widely 
acclaimed by the media and opinion-makers of the country. Yahya Khan 
was seen and portrayed as a leader who was trying to eliminate the corrupt 
officers of the Civil Services.  
 2.  The Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1971 leading to dismemberment of Pakistan 
further undermined the position of the bureaucracy in Pakistan. The CSP 
were further weakened as a cadre because 89 Bengali CSP officers holding 
posts above Deputy Secretary level (28 of whom were Joint Secretary or 
above), after the dismemberment of Pakistan opted for Bangladesh. Thus 
considerably reducing the influence of the CSP as a cadre [Kennedy 
(1987)]. Secondly, the media and the opinion-makers held the CSP in 
particular and the bureaucracy in general for the dismemberment of 
Pakistan. It was believed and argued that the policies made by the CSP had 
led to the dismemberment of the country.  
 3.  The electoral victory of the PPP in West Pakistan and the kind of attack on 
bureaucracy that Bhutto and his party started during the anti-Ayub 
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movement emerged as an important contributory factor. It is worth noting 
that in the PPP there were a number of left-leaning urban professionals who 
advocated that the Civil Services of Pakistan needed a reform. They also 
believed that the CSP were arrogant and anti-people. In public meetings 
Bhutto and his party stalwarts termed them as “Noker Shahi”, “Brahmins” 
and “Bara Sahibs”. 
Bhutto having served in Ayub’s government (1958–1966) was aware of the 
power and organisational capacity of the bureaucracy and was determined 
to reduce their power. Thus it can be stated that a combination of personal 
motive and the need for reform on the part of PPP and its leadership 
provided the context for introducing the 1973 reforms. The 1973 reforms 
were a radical departure from the established order. 
 
IMPACT OF 1973 REFORMS 
The 1973 administrative reforms although formulated in haste and never 
implemented in entirety, considerably reshaped the structure of the services and 
influenced the attitude formation, conduct and legal status of the civil servants 
(removal of constitutional guarantees). The impact of the reforms was as follows: 
 1.  The CSP, the Lineal descendant of ICS, was abolished. Its members were 
regrouped into the newly created District Management Group  (DMG), 
Tribal Administration Group (TAG) and the Secretariat Group. Although in 
1981 the DMG and TAG were merged as one group. 
 2.  The long standing practice of reservation of posts in the top Secretariat 
positions for the CSP was discontinued. As a result of All Pakistan Unified 
Grade System the distinction between CSP, PSP and others was ended. 
 3.  The various groups like Pakistan Audit and Accounts (PAAS), Pakistan 
Military Accounts (PMAS), Pakistan Railway Accounts (PRAS) were all 
merged into the Accounts Group. 
The 1973 Administrative Reforms, although radical were, not very well 
conceived nor sufficient effort was made to sustain the alternative that was to emerge 
as a consequence of reform. The reforms were wide ranging than is generally 
realised. They have considerably altered the structure of the services and promoted 
the notion of equality among them. But they did not sufficiently emphasise the need 
of efficiency, accountability and transparency in performance.  However, they did 
make the federal services more open, competitive and, at least, theoretically provided 
equality of opportunity to all CSS services. 
One of the salient features of the 1973 reforms that is not given adequate 
attention is that it opened up the DMG, Customs and Foreign Service cadres to 
women.  The Police Service continues to be an exception to the rule. Though in one 
recent case the widow of a police officer Killed on duty was inducted into the 
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service. Now since, 1973, each year depending on the size of recruitment in the CSS 
i.e. 150 to 200, 5 to 25 women have been joining the twelve federal services through 
the CSS: The average would vary between 5 to 10 percent of the total intake. These 
women compete on open merit with no reservation of seats, or quotas for women. 
Thus women who join the services are competitive, dynamic and despite difficulties 
make a difference in the work environment.  
The institution of Common Training Programme (CTP) has considerably 
tarnished the glory that the CSP had because of exclusivity of training, reservation of 
posts, differentiation of pay scales, etc. Training has made the service structure 
relatively open, competitive, egalitarian and amorphous. However, the mystique of 
CSP as the superior cadre still persists. Quite contrary to the popular perception that 
a larger number of fresh entrants prefer to join the Customs or Income Tax groups, 
preliminary estimates from 1987 to 1997 reveal that almost 97 percent fresh entrants 
write DMG as their first preference, followed by Police, Customs and Excise and for 
the fourth place Income Tax, Accounts and Foreign Service are in constant  
competition.  (See Table 3) It  is  interesting to note that despite purges and reforms 
the ‘mystique’ of the CSP lingers on. DMG is perceived as the successor to CSP by 
the new entrants as well as public and other interested groups. A combination of 
intangible factors, the fascination, myth, perceptions about district, belief in 
prospects of promotion, continue to attract the new entrants to opt for DMG. 
Preference patterns reveal that in opting for an occupational group, candidates are 
still driven by considerations of power, authority, prestige, status, etc. although the 
occupational groups  (Customs and Income Tax)  that rouse hopes for financial profit 
 
Table 3 
Under Training Officers Preference of Service Groups in Order of 
Ranking from 1 to 12 1987-1997 
% Wise Ranking 
Category I: Most Preferred Groups 
Ranking: Top Most 
DMG 97% 
Category II: 2nd Most Preferred Groups 
Ranking: 2–4  
Police Customs 
and Excise 
Income Tax 
85% to 95% 
Category III: Preferred Groups 
Ranking 4–8 
Foreign Service, 
Audit and 
Accounts, CAT 
60% to 80% 
Category IV: Less Preferred Groups 
Rankings: 8–12 
OMG, 
Information, 
Postal Railways 
MLC 
80% to 99% 
DMG = District Management Group. 
CAT  = Customs and Trade. 
MLC = Military Lands and Cantonments. 
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are gaining salience. The Foreign Service and Accounts groups seem to have fallen 
in the candidates’ scale.  
 
TRAINING AND CAREER PLANNING 
Training and career planning are essential for an efficient bureaucracy. In 
1961 the government initiated an administration policy. In pursuance of this policy 
the Pakistan Administrative Staff College and National Institute of Public 
Administration were established in Lahore. Simultaneously the discipline of Public 
Administration was also introduced as a Master’s degree programme at the Punjab 
University. The thrust was to build training institutions and to prepare the civil 
servants as good, efficient, administrators and policy-makers. However, the initiative 
was lost early, as no effort was made to train the trainers for the training institutions. 
Nor did the Establishment Division formulate any policy to link training with career 
advancement and vertical mobility of the civil servants. Therefore those who joined 
the training institutions as “some sort of professionals” and those civil servants who 
were posted in the training institutions as ‘deputationists’, never really had their 
‘heart and soul’ in training. The trainers at the training institutions developed into a 
disgruntled lot because they did not have any cadre system. They were and remain 
uncertain about their career advancement and prospects in the training institutions. 
The civil servants in general have accepted a posting at the training institutions with 
reluctance and hesitation. Rightly so, because posting at the training institutions is 
considered neither meritorious, nor has a good reflection on a civil servant’s career 
prospects. 
Unless training institutions are given the status that they deserve they would 
remain a temporary sanctuary for ‘out of favour’ officers. This would continue to 
happen the civil servants recognise that training is a long term investment in human 
resource development. Without professionally competent and motivated trainers, 
training would remain an exercise in futility. As we approach the year 2000, once 
again the FPSC, the Establishment Division, the controlling ministries, the training 
institutions and on top of all, the political leadership in the country, have to think of 
evolving a national training policy, which would prepare the Civil Services of 
Pakistan to deal with the complex issues of governance. 
The year 2010 will mark the end of an era, when all those who joined the 
service, prior to 1973, would have retired, but to steer the course of action for the 
21st century, a decision for the creation and sustenance of a policy-making group 
will have to be made during this decade. 
 
DEMOCRATISATION AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 
One of the major consequences of democratisation, particularly since 1988 
has been that each regime change is followed by large scale postings and transfers of 
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civil servants both at the policy-making level as well as at the district administration 
level. Resultantly, the civil services have become politicised and the concept of a 
neutral, upright, citizen friendly public servant has been considerably compromised. 
Political leaders and political parties forming a government need to take into 
cognisance that governance cannot improve without developing consensus on the 
desirability of an efficient, professionally competent, merit driven and non-partisan 
civil service. For good governance political support and political commitment is a 
prerequisite. 
There are three challenges that have emerged as a consequence of the global 
trend towards democratisation, privatisation, and internationalisation of world 
economy. The Civil Services of Pakistan are confronted with how to combat these 
challenges. The first major challenge is how to adapt and operate in a quasi 
democratic set up? In Pakistan the transition to democracy is taking place, but the 
rules and the spirit of democracy is being violated blatantly. Democracy implies 
government by law, besides electoral competition, majority rule and respect for 
minority rights and dissent. The challenge for the Civil Services is to provide an 
anchor for democratic consolidation. Civil Services reflect continuity of policies. 
Irrespective of who assumes political control, their job is to minimise conflict on 
policies, develop consensus and ensure continuity. Given their education, training, 
social background, they can play a pivotal role in strengthening democratic 
institutions. For the past two decades, conflict among the political leadership has 
polarised the Pakistani society. This polarisation has affected almost all segments of 
civil society. The challenge for the Civil Services as an institution is—how to diffuse 
this polarisation? 
Good governance has two dimensions: Political and technical. The Political 
component demands respect for law, acceptance of the rules of the game. More 
importantly what is needed is commitment among political leaders to build 
consensus through bargaining, negotiations and resolution of conflicts through non-
violent means. Simultaneously we have to build and expand the independent press, 
judiciary and parliamentary institutions. The technical component implies an 
efficient, competent, corruption free, honest, professionally trained civil service. The 
technical component demands training, career planning, acquisition of management 
techniques and new skills by the civil services to enable them to perform the 
functions of general welfare and national development.  
A third salient trend of the recent time is the great increase in violence, that 
undermines legitimacy of authority, polarises society and puts stress on the efficient 
functioning of state authority. In most cases it enhances police functions of the state, 
which in return has given a new twist to interaction among the district 
administration, police and politicians. Consequently, criminalisation of politics is an 
alarming trend in Pakistan. In addition politics of patronage and utilisation of state 
resources for political purposes has led to a situation where a district administration, 
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police—politician nexus is emerging as a salient characteristic of Pakistani politics. 
This nexus if allowed to grow at the current rate, would result in the formation of 
“Crime cartels” that have been witnessed in Latin America. 
The future of democracy and the consolidation of democratic institutions in 
the country depends not only on political parties but also on the civil servants in their 
ability to rouse trust and confidence of the people through professionally competent 
and honest management of the day-to-day business of the state in the service of the 
people and the country. 
 
GUIDELINES FOR CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 
In the light of foregoing analysis, following policy choices are recommended 
as broad guidelines for Civil Service reform—a reform that may lead to effective and 
humane governance.  
 
BUREAUCRAT, PROFESSIONAL, ACADEMIA PARTNERSHIP 
There is a need to evolve a balance between generalist practice and demands 
of professionalisation. In top policy positions the leadership of the generalist may be 
retained but professional’s advice and input must be encouraged and incorporated in 
the policy process. Twenty five years ago a Pakistani scholar making pioneer study 
of Civil Services perceptively suggested that “key posts” in government may be 
assigned to “generalist-specialist’—someone with “sustained practical experience in 
a single, well defined, broad area of government activity ... who displays special 
aptitude for general management” [Ahmad (1964)]. Partnership between bureaucrats, 
professionals, academic community on policy issues should be encouraged. It must 
be recognised that internal changes in Pakistani society and external environment 
have considerably weakened the monopoly of bureaucratic control on information 
and resources. Bureaucracies now need professional input for project formulation, 
project implementation and effective management. It demands a change in attitude 
and re-definition of their role. Since bureaucracies play a pivotal role in policy 
formulation, and development administration, therefore it is in their institutional 
interest to work for such a change. To strengthen processes that strengthen good 
governance, the bureaucracy needs to provide leadership in promoting a partnership 
among bureaucrats, professionals and academic community. 
 
PREDICTABLE DECISION-MAKING 
Extra-constitutional pressures can be avoided through strong and effective 
institutions, which demand upholding of rules and procedures that are simple, clear 
and fair. This would require consultation among political leaders, parliamentarians 
and the various agencies and departments of the government that must be routinised.  
What is needed is decision-making process that is not only transparent but also 
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reflects consensus and continuity of policies. It requires initiation of such steps: (a) 
Office manuals (OMs) be prepared  about each activity. (b) Detailed Job description 
be prepared for each post and quantifiable parameters be defined. (c) Criteria for 
periodical performance evaluations be prepared relevant to the jobs. (d) Feedbacks 
be obtained from concerned staff and also from institutionalised clients/interactive 
NGOs etc. 
 
TRAINING; DEVELOPING PROFESSIONAL SKILLS AND 
ENCOURAGING ATTITUDINAL CHANGE 
Merit alone should be the principal criteria for recruitment in public 
bureaucracy. Training must be regular and conducted at all levels. Training must be 
valued and the purposes and philosophy of training must be re-defined. Training 
should enhance professional skills and raise level of motivation for public service. It 
should also aim to bring about moral, ethical and attitudinal change in the public 
servant so that the perception of government from being a “patron” changes to that 
of a constitutional government. Training of the subordinate staff has been a neglected 
area for too long. One of the serious failures of higher bureaucracy has been its 
inability to regulate, control, monitor and evaluate the conduct and behaviour of 
subordinate staff. This demands a three pronged approach: (1) Develop transparent 
procedures of recruitment. In recruitment process recognised and effective NGO’s 
representatives be allowed to observe proceedings especially interviews. (2) 
Effective supervision that improves skills and conduct of the subordinate staff. (3) 
Training to enhance the quality of services rendered to the general public. 
 
STRENGTHENING POLICY LEVEL AND THE 
FEDERAL SECRETARIAT 
The 1973 Administrative reforms did facilitate integration among the twelve 
federal services. They also ensured equality of pay scales among all groups/services. 
However these reforms did not provide a clear vision and framework for equal 
opportunity and prospect of promotion for all groups. This has generated rivalry 
among the services which dominate the federal secretariat and in the process has 
affected the policy-making process. It merits attention that a federal secretariat 
devoid of federal spirit and character could increasingly become a burden rather than 
asset for the federation. Therefore, there is a need to frame rules and procedures for 
the senior positions, where merit, performance, ability to take decisions to innovate 
is given weightage and not simply seniority or belonging to a particular service 
group assigned on the basis of CSS examination. 
The bureaucracy in Pakistan is not a monolith. It is divided into a number of 
groups/services that are constantly engaged in a struggle for supremacy. Each 
group/service is a functional entity. The CSP/DMG is both perceived and considered 
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as the actual elite service: it is envied and emulated. This elite group has continued to 
maintain dominance on positions of strategic decision-making in the secretariat and 
at the district level. It is the Federal Secretariat which is becoming an arena of 
competition and rivalry among services—because control over the Secretariat means 
control over policy-making and the federal government. Ironically despite this inside 
rivalry, in public perception the bureaucracy is seen as a monolith, gigantic and 
united to rule, exploit and perpetuate the status quo. Yet deep down these groups are 
inter-dependant and viz-à-viz other public institutions they show a tendency to band 
together. 
The workings, orientation and culture of each of these functional groups 
varies. The dynamics of work, growth and prospects of vertical mobility are also 
different. However, procedures, slow pace, reluctance to take initiative and general 
apathy towards citizens’ welfare is a malaise from which the entire Pakistani 
bureaucracy suffers. 
The federal secretariat as a policy-making organisation needs to be 
strengthened. Theoretically, at the Deputy Secretary level, the secretariat is open to 
all services. But officers are reluctant to join because comparatively they have more 
facilities and perks in the provincial governments. It would be beneficial if the talent 
from all government departments is allowed to join the secretariat through a fair and 
transparent competitive selection process. Besides other quantifiable considerations, 
open competitive examination be conducted to induct people in the federal 
secretariat (a classic example is of the Commercial Councillors recently. Only a few 
privileged knew about the examination and were selected for postings outside). Posts 
be reserved in each grade (out of the total) for each service group in Federal 
Secretariat. The criteria for selection should be professional expertise, diversity of 
experience, demonstrable leadership performance in public institutions; capacity to 
innovate and accept challenging assignments. 
It should be the right of every democratically elected government to appoint 
persons of its choice in top policy-making positions. These persons could be 
appointed from within or outside the bureaucracy on a three to four year contract 
being performance based. What is being suggested is that once these appointments 
are made they be allowed to act without interference and according to the rules. 
 
FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
There is a need to devise rules and procedures for freedom of access to 
information. Currently, bureaucracy thrives on withholding information under the 
garb of secrecy. Information on any—area of public concern (Including Customs, 
FIRs (I.Tax) but its intra-working decisions also (e.g. budgetary grants, expenditures, 
employee promotions, disciplinary actions etc.) must be available to citizens. The 
government may levy a token fees for this purpose, but information must be 
available readily. The freedom of access to information could make public 
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transactions transparent, it will minimise the usage of discretionary powers if any, 
and would make the bureaucracy conscious of accountability. Once the civil servants 
realise that any information from government can be obtained in public interest, 
swiftly and at a small financial cost, their ability to use discretionary laws would be 
restricted. Then discretion would be used only for public good and public welfare 
and not against public interest. 
 
RECASTING THE IMAGE OF THE CIVIL SERVANT 
Civil Servants as enforcers of rule of law and implementers of policy are 
expected to act as conscience of the society. Ideally they must be guided by what is 
in the best interest of the citizens, and not of a particular person, political party or a 
group. In Pakistani society, there is a growing gap between the self-image of a civil 
servant—that he is achiever, holds authority, power and possesses superior intellect, 
and that this has been demonstrated by the success in the competitive examination. 
This self-image keeps the civil servant beholden to power and encourages 
detachment. Then there is a public image of the civil servant—which is that the civil 
servant is arrogant, aloof, authoritarian, corrupt, symbolising coercion and injustice. 
Over the years this gap between the self-image and the public perception has 
widened. This has put tremendous pressure on the civil servant and public scrutiny 
has become harsher. Thus the onus of responsibility is on the civil servants to alter 
this image. They need to project and perform not as rulers but as servants of the 
public. Similarly the public advocates also need to re-look at the role of civil 
servants, a little more objectively and specific to situations. In a culture where 
familiarity encourages influence peddling, it becomes desirable that in public interest 
and to impart justice and fairness, the civil servant may remain detached from 
showing preference for one or other group. Impartiality, fairness, adjudication of 
justice through transparency need to become the guiding principles of the bureaucrat. 
 
ATTRACTIVE SALARY PACKAGE 
To make public service attractive two conditions are essential. First, restore 
the pride in public service by promoting merit and performance and by eliminating 
safarish and patronage. It is difficult but not impossible. Second, provide an 
attractive salary package—a package that has some semblance of proportion between 
the elite status of the higher civil services (CSS Services), and the powers of 
authority that are vested in them. One is not advocating a salary structure comparable 
to private sector but a salary package that is competitive and encourages honesty and 
integrity among the public officials. There should be salary/pay scales  with regular 
increments and then bonus increments to those who show excellent performance 
over the last year. This should not be awarded on just the superiors’ evaluation but 
on formal feedback of subordinates, evaluation of quantifiable work output and also 
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weighing in some cases on the recommendations of established NGOs/concerned 
public. Similar promotions to each grade especially from grade 17 onwards be not 
just on the number of years put in and on vacancies but also on other factors (on the 
basis as described above). 
A formal feedback from subordinates, which is given some weightage in the 
evaluation of the superior himself is necessary. This step would also give subordinate 
staff confidence and would thus make CSS officer less overbearing. Individual 
integrity is a desirable goal but institutional integrity is imperative. 
 
DECENTRALISATION AND DEVOLUTION OF POWER 
There is no gainsaying the fact that financial and administrative powers of 
the provinces need to be enhanced. However there is need to build and 
strengthen the local bodies institutions. Community participation would grow 
and expand if we began to streamline structures at the district and tehsil levels. 
At these levels the role of district administration needs to be redirected from that 
of a patron to being an equal partner—a complementarity between the district 
administration and local bodies—a functional specialisation—where the two 
interact and strengthen public institutions at the grass root level. 
At the local level the functions of councillors and the district 
administration overlap. Traditionally the distract administration managed the 
functions of recruitment, development funding/projects and collection of 
Zila/Tehsil Taxes. The role of district administrator was both advisory and 
paternal. The powers were concentrated in the district administration. However, 
with expansion of political participation, democratisation and electoral 
contestation, demands for devolution of authority have increased. The elected 
public officials at the local and district level began to demand greater share and 
control in recruitments, identification and implementation of developmental 
projects and tax collection. This intensified conflict of interest between the 
district administrators and local councillors. This conflict has affected 
governance at the local level. To strength local government institutions, 
enhancing community participation and devolution of power, it is desirable that 
power-sharing mechanisms be evolved and strengthened between local public 
office holders and district administration. Decentralisation has failed—the 
answer to the problem is devolution of authority. 
 
BUILDING TRUST: REDEFINING SUPERORDINATE- 
SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP 
A recent report by O.E.C.D on changing direction in management correctly 
notes that: 
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Governance reflects a pluralisation of the important actors in governing 
and in providing public service. The configuration of public institutions 
is changing; the roles of super- and sub national bodies are becoming 
more important; and semi-public and private sector actors are becoming 
more widely and deeply involved. 
Thus interaction is becoming less authoritative and more cooperative. This 
demands an attitudinal change, because compliance through top-down orders alone is 
becoming increasingly difficult. A public official’s skills to persuade colleagues and 
motivate the staff to accomplish a task is gaining weightage. This demands building 
a relationship of trust, confidence and credibility between a public official as the 
leader and a subordinate as a functionary of the government. 
Doors to higher position should also be made easier for subordinate staff, so 
that they too have a stake in the system to work honestly and effectively. 
Parallel Groups be created whose only job would be to address the problems 
being confronted by the public (these parallel bodies are already in place but are 
manned by their respective groups e.g. redressal from Income Tax is before I.Tax 
Appellate Tribunal, etc. These invariably support their Peers). They should also 
include NGO representatives if possible. Press may also be allowed participation. 
These parallel institutions should also prepare periodical reports on the 
functioning of the above and give it to press. 
Detailed transparency documents of the functioning of each department/major 
formations be prepared (by inviting people of diverse background and interest 
groups) for example, PWD, I.Tax, NHA, CAA etc. These documents called office 
manuals would replace the existing ambiguous subjective office procedures. 
Financial Rules be drawn anew and be made easy and simple (e.g. now 
officials have different powers to purchase the same thing under different 
grants/heads of expenditure) Financial Rules are so complex (for the same reason 
they are flouted than observed) that even a CSS officer of 25–30 years of experience 
is ignorant about these and more often than not needs a shrewed person from the 
subordinate staff to handle the purchase. 
Thus the premium is on the personal traits, performance, reputation and 
professional skills of the individual officer. Upon his commitment, credibility, 
persuasive skills and professional expertise depends the performance of the staff. 
Credibility and performance of public institutions is dependant on the quality of 
manpower. If the quality of manpower declines, the decay of public institutions 
follows. To arrest the decay of public institutions one needs to invest in the human 
capital—the focus has to be strengthening personal integrity and professional 
expertise of the manpower. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the review of literature, changing socioeconomic profile and attitude 
formulation among the federal bureaucrats we can conclude that despite limitations, 
the elite status and staying power of the bureaucracy is generally recognised, this is 
particularly more pronounced in Pakistan. Here again like most of the Third World 
states signs of erosion are visible. Bureaucratic institutions are certainly in a disarray 
if not in decline. There are two options available: first, a radical restructuring of the 
existing bureaucratic order. Secondly, a piece-meal but holistic reform of the existing 
bureaucratic institutions. In this paper, I have opted for the second option, and 
provided guide lines for a piece-meal reform in a broad set of areas. An effort has 
been made to analyse the framework of bureaucratic order and identify areas where 
reform is urgently needed. To arrest the process of decay in the bureaucratic 
institutions and to make a turnaround, a partnership among professionals, 
bureaucrats and academia is a desirable goal for building an environment and 
framework for reform. Secondly, to bring about an attitudinal change and improve 
the skills of civil servants, strengthening of training institutions is a must. Thirdly, 
devolution of power in the districts and redefining the power structure of the federal 
secretariat is essential. Fourthly, the salary package for the civil servant is out of tune 
with financial realities, it needs a drastic revision, if we aim to reduce corruption, 
injustice and improve the efficiency of the public servant. Fifth, most importantly, 
political leadership and bureaucracy need to develop a transparent and effective 
partnership for promoting public interest and ensuring humane governance. An 
adversarial relationship between the two or an interlocking to protect the vested 
interest of privileged groups only, would mar the growth of robust institutions, 
undermine effective governance and consolidation of democracy. Finally it must be 
understood and appreciated that civil service is a profession where one is expected to 
work for the welfare of the fellow citizens, it is not simply managerial 
professionalism, it has a ethical and human dimension—welfare of the fellow 
citizens. 
 
REFERENCES 
Ahmad, Muneer (1964) Civil Servant in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press.  
Ahmad, Muneer (1974) Political Sociology; Perspectives on Pakistan. Lahore: Punjabi 
Adabi Markaz. 
Apter, David (1967) Politics of Modernisation. Chicago: University Press of Chicago.  
Boeninger, Edgardo (1991) Governance and Development: Issues and Constraints. In 
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development: Economics. 
The World Bank. 267–288. 
Braibanti, Ralph (1966) Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan: A Critique of 
Sources and Issues. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.  
Crisis of Governance 1017
Burki, Shahid Javed (1968) A Historical Perspective on Development. In Shahid Javed 
Burki and Robert Laporte Jr. (eds) Pakistan’s Development Priorities: Choices for 
the Future. Karachi: Oxford University Press.  15–44. 
Burki, Shahid Javed (1969) Twenty Five Years of the Civil Service in Pakistan: A Re-
evaluation. Asian Survey 9:4  239–254. 
Burki, Shahid Javed, and Robert Laporte Jr. (eds) (1986) Pakistan’s Development 
Priorities: Choices for the Future. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Drucker, Peter (1998) In Defence of Japan’s Bureaucracy. Foreign Affairs 77:5  250–
253. 
Hulme, David (1997) Governance, Administration and Development: Making the State 
Work.  London: Macmillan Press. 105–131. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 250–253. 
Kennedy, Charles (1987) Bureaucracy in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press. 
Lapalambora, Joseph (1963) Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
Laporte Jr, Robert (1975) Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in 
Pakistan. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Martin, Dennis Constant (1991) The Cultural Dimensions of Governance. In 
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development, Economics, 
Washington, The World Bank.  325–342. 
Mufti, Masud (n.d.) A retired former Civil Servant who frequently writes in Dawn on 
the decline and decay of Civil Services in Pakistan. 
O, Donell, Gulimero (1973) Modernisation and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies 
in South America Politics, Politics of Modernisation. Berkeley, Institute of 
International Studies, University of California Press. (Series No. 9.) 
O.E.C.D. (1997) Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Managing 
Across Levels of Development, Paris, OECD. 15–16. 
Osborne, and Ted Baebler (1993) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Penguin, Palme. 
Osborne, David Plastrick (1996) and Banishing Bureaucracy:  The Five Plastrick, Peter 
Strategies for Reinventing Government. Reading, (M.A) Addison - Wesley. 
Pakistan, Government of (1962) Report of the Pay and Services Commission: 1959-
1962. Karachi.  
Siddique, Tasneem, Has been associatd with Hyderabad Kachi Abadi Scheme and has 
written in Dawn on the decline of Public Service in Pakistan. 
Vorys, Karl Von 1965 Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press. 
World Bank (1983) World Bank Report. Washington, D. C. 
World Bank (1985) World Bank Report. Washington, D. C. 
World Bank (1993) World Bank Report. Washington, D. C. 
World Bank (1997) World Bank Report. Washington, D. C. 
